29. The European Communities contends that Article XIX of the GATT 1994 also requires parallelism. The liberalization obligation must lead to an increase in imports, which in turn must lead to serious damage. Under Article XIX, compensation for this material injury can only be the suspension of the relevant GATT or WTO liberalization obligation. Therefore, Argentina`s obligations under its customs union cannot justify a safeguard measure and imports subject to such obligations must be excluded from the examination. In this context, the European Communities notes that Argentina is not obliged not to impose protective measures on its MERCOSUR partners, but only an internal obligation of Mercosur. Yes. If you are aware of any safeguards that have had or are likely to have a negative impact on your company`s export activities, contact the U.S. Department of Commerce`s Trade Agreement Negotiations and Compliance Hotline. The U.S. government is available to provide information and assistance to U.S.

companies that believe they have been harmed by a WTO member country`s non-compliance with this agreement. While it cannot guarantee that your problem can be resolved, the U.S. government may be able to discuss the specific facts of your situation with officials in the other country concerned. In 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors decided that the Small Quantities Protocols should continue to be available with a revised standard text to be used for all future Small Quantities Protocols and requested States with the Original Small Quantities Protocols to adopt the revised Small Quantities Protocol as soon as possible. The revised Small Quantities Protocol reduces the number of provisions of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement that are kept in limbo and important provisions on the reporting of nuclear material and the conduct of inspections are in force. (b) In addition, a Member shall not seek, take or maintain voluntary export restrictions, orderly marketing arrangements or other similar measures on the export or import side. (3) 4. This includes actions taken by an individual member and actions taken under agreements, understandings and understandings entered into by two or more members. Any such measure in force on the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement shall be brought into conformity with this Agreement or progressively abolished in accordance with paragraph 2. The Small Quantities Protocol is a protocol that can be concluded in conjunction with a comprehensive safeguards agreement. It has been available since 1971 and its text was standardized in 1974 (original protocol for small quantities). The five nuclear-weapon States of the NPT have concluded safeguards agreements that cover all or part of their peaceful nuclear activities.

Under these voluntary tendering agreements, entities are notified to the IAEA by the State concerned and offered to apply safeguard measures. The IAEA applies precautionary measures within the framework of voluntary tendering agreements for nuclear materials at certain facilities. 2. (a) Where a quota is allocated among the supplier countries, the Member State applying the restrictions may request an agreement on the allocation of quotas with all other Members which have a substantial interest in the supply of the product concerned. In cases where this method is not reasonably practicable, the Member concerned shall allocate with Members which have a substantial interest in the supply of the shares of the goods on the basis of the shares of the quantity or total value of imports of the product supplied by those Members during a previous representative period, taking into account specific factors: which have influenced or could influence trade in the goods shall be duly taken into account. The original Small Quantities Protocol was made available to States with little or no nuclear material and no nuclear material in a ”facility”. The original Protocol on Small Quantities suspends the application of many provisions of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (in Part II). While this simplifies the implementation of safeguards in a state with an original protocol of small quantities, it also results in a number of restrictions. Article 1 states that the SG Agreement is the instrument by which the measures referred to in Article XIX of the GATT 1994 may be applied.

This means that any measure for which the scope of Article XIX (which allows for the suspension of GATT concessions and commitments in the context of established emergencies) is invoked must be taken in accordance with the provisions of the SG Agreement. The Agreement expressly does not apply to measures taken under other provisions of GATT 1994, other multilateral trade agreements referred to in Annex 1A or protocols and agreements or arrangements concluded under GATT 1994. (art. 11.1.c)) Such agreements apply only to nuclear material, non-nuclear material, facilities and other elements specified in safeguards agreements. They are based on the safeguard procedures set out in INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 and earlier versions of this document. States parties to these conventions undertake not to use nuclear material, facilities or other objects subject to the Convention for the manufacture of a nuclear weapon or for the promotion of military purposes. The IAEA implements safeguards measures under these agreements in three States that are not parties to the NPT. 4.247 Fourth, the European Communities argues that if the authors wished to depart from Article XIX, they should have done so explicitly, citing the Appellate Body Report EC-Bananas 109 as a justification for this claim. Korea notes that the EC banana case concerned another agreement, the Agreement on Agriculture, in which the authors provided for explicit derogations. An example is Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture, although Korea noted that Article 5 provides only for an express derogation from Article II.

(1) (b) of the GATT, and not article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguard Measures. 31. The European Communities requests the Appellate Body to maintain the Panel`s findings on ”increased imports”. The European Communities argues that the requirement to ”increase imports” in Article 2(1) of the Agreement on Safeguard Measures ”must now be read in the light of the new set of rights and obligations”33, including Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguard Measures, as well as on the basis of the objective and purpose of those agreements. Given the content of the new ”package”, the provision on ”increased imports” necessarily contains more than under the safeguard system provided for in Article XIX of the GATT 1947. The European Communities concludes that a strictly quantitative interpretation of the requirement of an ”increase in imports” (assuming that such an interpretation existed under Article XIX of the GATT 1947) can no longer be reconciled with the operation of the safeguard mechanism within the WTO. When applying a safeguard measure, the Member shall maintain a substantially equivalent level of concessions and other obligations towards the exporting Members concerned. To this end, appropriate means of trade equalisation may be agreed with the Members concerned. In the absence of such an agreement, the exporting Members concerned may individually suspend concessions and other substantially equivalent obligations. The latter right may not be exercised during the first three years of application of a safeguard measure if the measure is taken on the basis of an absolute increase in imports and is otherwise in conformity with the provisions of the Agreement. .